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We empirically analyze the illicit trade in cultural property and antiques, taking advantage of different
reporting incentives between source and destination countries. We thus generate a measure of illicit
trafficking in these goods based on the difference between imports recorded in United States' customs
data and the (purportedly identical) trade as recorded by customs authorities in exporting countries.
We find that this reporting gap is highly correlated with the corruption level of the exporting country
as measured by commonly used survey-based indicies, and that this correlation is stronger for artifact-rich
countries. As a placebo test, we do not observe any such pattern for U.S. imports of toys from these
same exporters. We report similar results for four other Western country markets. Our analysis provides
a useful framework for studying trade in illicit goods. Further, our results provide empirical confirmation
that survey-based corruption indicies are informative, as they are correlated with an objective measure
of illicit activity.
Raymond Fisman








Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
Uris Hall, Room 619
3022 Broadway





The smuggling of antiques and cultural property is thought to be big business. All countries 
impose restrictions on the export of various classes of cultural property and antiques,
1 ranging 
from archeological objects to coins to older art works.
2 Hence their sale abroad often requires their 
illegal export from the country of origin. As with other activities of questionable legality, however, 
it has been difficult to put a precise figure on the full extent of trafficking in cultural goods. For 
trade in antiquities (unearthed ancient objects), which makes up only one component of the total 
illegal trade in cultural objects, estimates ranging from $300 million up to $6 billion per year 
(Atwood, 2004). According to Interpol’s estimates, the antiquities trade on its own ranks behind 
only drugs and arms in its scale of illegal trafficking (Toner, 1999). Collectively, these illicit 
activities represent the darker side of globalization – smuggling requires extra-legal activities that 
may abet corruption, impose a strain on international relations, and potentially dampen the gains 
from legitimate international trade.
3 Thus, illicit trade is an important element of political economy 
and international trade. Unfortunately, we have little systematic knowledge of the dynamics of 
illicit trade, as data on illegal activities are by their very nature difficult to obtain.  
In this paper, we analyze the illicit trade in cultural objects by taking advantage of a unique 
aspect of their trade relative to other forms of smuggling: The stark difference in the legality and 
legal enforcement of a particular shipment between exporting and importing countries. In 
particular, the exportation of broad classes of cultural objects is prohibited by most countries 
without a special permit. However, once these (illegally) exported goods have left the country of 
origin, they are not generally regarded as contraband when imported into their destination, absent 
additional agreements that we discuss below (Gerstenblith, 2008). In the United States specifically, 
there is actually a strong incentive to report accurately on the importation of cultural objects: Any 
goods entering the United States that are not properly declared are subject to customs seizure; 
further, the zero tariff rate on antiques and cultural objects entering the country removes any 
incentive to misdeclare valuation (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2006). Even in cases 
                                                 
1 Henceforth referred to simply as cultural objects or antiques. Throughout this paper we will be considering those 
products that, by international trade classification, belong to Harmonized System (HS) Product Code 9706 – Antiques 
of an age exceeding one hundred years. 
2 The specific classes of objects that are restricted from export as well as the rules for gaining permission to export 
restricted objects differ across countries. The rules defy simple categorization or measurement of restrictiveness. See 
Prott and O’Keefe (1988) for the most recent comprehensive description of these laws worldwide. 
3 See Andreas (1998) for an overview of these issues.   3
where importation is of questionable legality, differences in the burden of proof between exporting 
countries and the U.S. generally allow for the relatively easy import of goods whose export would 
not have been permitted by the source country.  
As a result of these asymmetric reporting incentives, reported imports of cultural objects 
into the United States provide a plausible measure of the ‘true’ level of trade in these goods that 
we may compare with the export levels reported by cultural object-rich countries. The difference 
between these two trade figures provides a credible measure of illegal exports. 
What allows for the illicit export of cultural objects from the source country? Not 
surprisingly, when smugglers are apprehended and their operations exposed, their activities are 
often found to be facilitated through the bribing of customs officials to look the other way (Brody 
et al, 2000). Hence, the illegal and unreported export of cultural objects is relatively easy in 
countries with corrupt bureaucracies that allow for this type of transaction. Hence, if cross-country 
survey-based measures of corruption do indeed reflect underlying corruption realities, these 
measures should be good predictors of patterns of global trafficking in cultural objects. In this 
sense, we may use our measure that is derived from objectively measured trade data to assess the 
validity of these corruption indices that are often based on subjective perceptions. 
In this paper, we present an objective measure of smuggling in cultural objects based on 
this reporting gap between recorded exports on an exporter’s side and the recorded imports by U.S. 
Customs. Without smuggling (and measurement error), the reporting gap should be zero. If the gap 
were pure measurement error, it should not be correlated with country-level attributes. However, 
we find that our smuggling measure is very highly correlated (with correlation coefficient =0.52) 
with standard cross-country survey-based corruption indices, thus providing compelling and 
objective validation of these indices. This pattern is robust to the inclusion of region effects and 
controls for countries’ endowment of desirable/collectible cultural objects. Interestingly, our 
smuggling variable is uncorrelated with the log of income per capita once the exporter’s corruption 
level is controlled for, so it is unlikely that we are simply picking up the effects of country-level 
wealth.  
Several additional tests lend further support to our interpretation of the results. First, the 
corruption-smuggling gap relationship is stronger for object-rich countries. Second, we run a 
placebo regression using data on the reporting gap in the U.S imports of toys between the 
exporter’s and US customs (U.S. reported imports of toys from a country, minus that country’s   4
reported exports of toys to the U.S. in the same year). Similar to imports of cultural objects into the 
United States, toy imports also have a zero tariff rate on the U.S. side. In this case, we observe no 
correlation between an exporter’s corruption level and the customs reporting gap, suggesting that 
cultural objects do indeed present a special case. Finally, we report results for four other countries 
– Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland – all with zero tariffs on cultural objects that 
are also reported to have a significant trade in these goods; we find a positive relationship between 
corruption and the ‘smuggling gap’ for all four countries.  
  Our paper thus makes two primary contributions: Most importantly, we provide a first 
empirical analysis of the trade in restricted goods, and further provide comparable cross-country 
estimates on the smuggling of contraband.
 4 We thus contribute to the growing literature on 
measuring underground activities using differential reporting incentives (see, for example, Fisman 
and Wei, 2004; Yang, 2007; Mishra et al, 2007). However, we highlight two key departures from 
the prior literature: First, earlier studies have largely focused on a single exporting country; 
second, previous research has focused on tariff evasion rather than the trafficking of illegal objects. 
By contrast, cultural objects imports face no tariffs in the U.S. and other major markets (hence 
tariff evasion is not the motivation) but are often subject to export controls in the country of origin. 
Second, we provide a clear validation of subjective corruption indices based on objective trade 
data.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a short background on 
laws governing the trade in antiques and cultural goods. Section 3 provides a description of the 
data, and Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Legal background on international trade in cultural property and antiques
5 
 
Goods that have been illegally exported from one country are not generally regarded as contraband 
when imported into the United States, absent some further agreement.
6 In the case of cultural 
                                                 
4 Another related paper is Fisman and Miguel (2006), who using parking violations of U.N. diplomats in New York as 
a cross-country measure of corruption norms. Relative to that study, our method has the advantage of focusing on 
customs, a much larger (and often notoriously corrupt) branch of the civil service in many countries. 
5 This section draws heavily on Borodkin (1995) and Gerstenblith (2008). We provide only a cursory discussion here; 
please see these references for further details. 
6 In fact, the Department of Homeland Securities guidance to importers makes this point explicitly. See 
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/toolbox/legal/informed_compliance_pubs/icp061.ctt/icp061.pdf (downloaded 
April 2, 2007) for further details.   5
objects there are some limited, albeit important, statutes that do provide some constraints on the 
importation of some classes of goods. However, as we discuss below, these constraints are 
generally quite limited. 
Trade in cultural property is covered in the United States by the Convention on Cultural 
Property Implementation Act (CPIA). In the CPIA, cultural property is defined as objects, 
collections, specimens, structures, or sites identified as having artistic, historic, scientific, 
religious, or social significance.
7 The CPIA is the result of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property, an international agreement intended to control trade in cultural property. This 
agreement required that signatories take steps to make illegal the importation and/or sale of 
cultural objects that were removed illegally from any country that was party to the Convention. It 
was ratified by the United States in 1972, but required further action by the Congress before its 
statutes became law. This was done in a very limited form through the CPIA, resulted in the 
implementation of just two sections of the UNESCO convention.  
First, the CPIA prohibits the import into the United States of stolen objects that had been 
documented in the inventory of a public or secular institution in countries that are signatories to the 
Convention. Second, the CPIA grants the President the authority to impose further import 
restrictions on specific types of objects through bilateral agreements with other countries. The 
other nation must request such an agreement. The United States has signed twelve agreements, and 
in eight cases there is variation during 1996-2005.
8 However, the existing agreements have mostly 
addressed trade only for a narrow range of objects (e.g., Pre-Columbian artifacts from the Petén in 
Guatemala and Pre-Classical and Classical archaeological objects in Cyprus). Further, the CPIA 
provides only for civil forfeiture of the products in questions and has no criminal penalties. Thus, 
overall, the CPIA has very limited coverage and weak punishment. 
The U.S. National Stolen Property Act (NSPA) criminalizes the knowing transport, receipt, 
and possession of stolen property worth more than 5,000 dollars across international (or state) 
                                                 
7 See Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention for the full definition of cultural property, available at 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/html_eng/page2.shtml (downloaded on April 17, 2007). 
8 We did examine whether the gap between reported exports and imports of antiques and cultural property was affected 
by the signing of these agreements. Our specifications generally produced coefficients that were consistent with a 
decreased gap in response to a treaty. However, the results were generally not significant and very sensitive to 
specification and classification of initial year of treaty and emergency agreements. This is not surprising given the very 
narrow focus on archaeological objects, the small sample size and the noise in the data. Given the difficulties in 
interpreting these results, we do not focus on them in this paper.   6
boundaries. The NSPA provides harsher penalties than the CPIA. An individual who knowingly 
engages in this conduct can be criminally prosecuted. This effectively allows for the prosecution 
for trafficking in objects that can be proven to have come from known collections in a foreign 
country. More substantially, the NSPA has been applied in recent years in prosecuting antiquities 
smugglers. This derives from laws enacted in most countries with antiquities endowments that 
assign ownership of unearthed antiquities to the government. These ownership laws apply to any 
objects discovered or excavated after the effective date of the statute. If an object is excavated (or 
looted) after this date and removed from the country without permission, then the object is 
considered stolen from the government and retains its status as stolen even after it is brought to the 
United States. However, we expect this to have a very limited impact on our measure of 
smuggling, since antiquities represent only a fraction of the overall of trade in cultural objects.
9 
Further, it has been difficult in practice for cases to be brought to court under the NSPA: Many 
antiquities in the United States were excavated illegally and without the knowledge of the 
exporting country’s authorities, and thus lack sufficient documentation to make a case of guilt, and 
because the burden of proving that an object has an illegal background falls on the exporting 
country’s government or claimant, the proof may be inadequate in a U.S. court to establish that an 
undocumented antiquity is an illegally excavated or traded one. If imported cultural objects do not 
show up in a U.S. museum (as most do not), the exporter’s government may not be aware of such 
trade.  
On the other hand, there exists some positive incentive to report truthfully upon entry into 
the United States, as improper declaration of the goods upon entry (e.g. lying about the value or 
the country of origin) may result in forfeiture. Combined with the zero tariff rate on imports of 
cultural objects, there is incentive to report honestly the import of cultural objects. 
By contrast, laws on the books in ‘object-rich’ countries generally shift the burden of proof 
to the would-be exporter – many nations follow a licensing scheme where permission is required 
for export, and others apply their national ownership laws proactively where documentation is 
required for export. However, as noted in the introduction, corruption is thought to be rife in many 
such countries, and hence exported objects may circumvent legal channels. 
                                                 
9 Personal communication with Professor Patty Gerstenblith. Since trade statistics do not disaggregate antiques into its 
constituent parts, it is difficult to know the proportion of cultural property and antiques that are antiquities.   7
In summary, there is a stark asymmetry in the reporting imperatives between exporting 
nations and the United States. In exporting nations, traders may either not declare cultural objects 
to their customs at all or obscure an object’s true value (e.g., label it as a cheap tourist souvenir). 
On the importing side, the incentives to provide misleading information are limited, and given the 
potential for seizure by the U.S. government for false declaration, there exist some strong 




Our import and export data come from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database, 
which in turn gets its trade statistics from the United Nations' Comtrade database.  These data are 
collected by the United Nations Statistical Division from individual countries' trade records, and 
include information on imports and exports for each country, recorded according to the 6-digit 
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS). We use data for all years for which 
data are available on imports and exports which results in an unbalanced panel for 1996-2005. We 
will also report results below from the balanced panel. 
  Most export-restricted objects are classified as having HS code 9706 (antiques of an age 
exceeding one hundred years).
10 Some products in this category are not subject to export controls, 
and some products that are subject to restrictions take other classifications. We will also report 
results based on an aggregation to the two-digit HS code level (97 – Works of art. Collectors’ 
pieces, antiques). This is more comprehensive but also potentially incorporates greater noise due to 
the inclusion of non-controlled objects. All products in HS code 97 enter the United States tariff 
free. 
  Our primary outcome variable is given by:  
 
(1) Antiques_Gapcy = log(1 + US_Importscy) – log(1 + Exports_to_UScy) 
 
                                                 
10 See, for example, the European Union guidelines for the protection of cultural property 
(http://www.culture.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/6FC9A8B7-7C91-495F-AC7A-
653A45288CC5/0/EUGuidelinesforculturalgoods.pdf downloaded on April 19, 2007).   8
where c indexes country, y indexes year, US_Importscy is the imports reported by the United States 
from country c, and Exports_to_UScy is the exports reported by country c destined for the United 
States. The industry subscript is suppressed, and is HS Code 9706 unless otherwise noted.  
  Our primary measure of corruption (Corruptioncy) is from the World Bank Institute 
(Kaufman et al, 2006), which generates a composite corruption rating that is essentially the first 
principal component of all other available (mostly subjective) corruption indices of country c in 
year y. To avoid confusion, we use the negative of the values presented in Kaufman et al so that 
values of Corruptioncy are increasing in the level of corruption. This variable is available for 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002-2005. Since virtually all variation is cross-sectional, we use the lagged value of 
Corruptioncy for 1997, 1999, and 2001. 
  It may be useful to account for countries’ endowment of cultural objects, especially those 
considered desirable in the major buyer’s markets. Our proxy for this is premised on the 
assumption that a country’s endowment of such objects is highly correlated with (or proportional 
to) the holdings of that country’s cultural objects by the Metropolitan Museum of Art (Met) in 
New York City. The Met’s collection affords a number of advantages in generating a measure for 
the potential supply of desirable cultural objects. First, most of its holdings were acquired prior to 
the advent of international agreements to control the global flow of cultural property. Second, its 
collection is vast, and its mission provides a very general mandate to “collect, preserve, study, 
exhibit, and stimulate appreciation for and advance knowledge of works of art that collectively 
represent the broadest spectrum of human achievement.” Hence, its collections are not focused on 
any particular country or region. An inventory of the Met’s full collection has not yet been put in 
digital form. We utilize the listing of the museum’s highlights available on the Met’s webpage, 
restricting our attention to pre-19
th century non-U.S. collections that would be affected by export 
restrictions in the source countries.
11  
We generate a simple count variable (MetHoldingsc) based on 493 (pre-19
th century) 
objects listed, reflecting the number of objects in the highlights collection from each country c. In 
almost all cases a single country is listed as the object’s origin. Where multiple countries are listed, 
we assign partial points equally to all countries. Finally, for 23 objects, ancient regions are listed; 
                                                 
11 http://www.metmuseum.org/Works_of_Art/collection.asp?HomePageLink=permanentcollection_l (downloaded on 
April 19, 2007). The specific categories that we use are Ancient Near Eastern; Arts of Africa, Oceania & the 
Americas; Greek & Roman Art; Asian Art; Egyptian Art; Islamic Art; European Paintings; pre-19
th century European 
Sculptures.   9
we assign partial points equally to all countries that overlap geographically with the ancient region. 
For example, for the three objects from the Levant, we assign 0.2 points each to Israel, Syria, 
Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. Given the high dispersion in MetHoldingsc, we will employ an 
indicator variable, MetDummyc that denotes whether MetHoldingsc is positive, and also log(1 + 
MetHoldingsc) in our analyses.  
We use GDP per capita in 2000 U.S. dollars (GDPPCUScy), taken from the World 
Development Indicators database, as a control for the overall level of economic development. As 
an additional control we use the distance between two countries weighted by the location of their 
populations (Distancec), from Mayer and Zignago (2005), which may be reflective of transport 
costs. Finally, we will allow for region-year fixed effects, where the regions are North America 
and the Caribbean; Latin America; Europe; Africa; Asia; Oceania; and the Middle East. 
We restrict our attention for the sample with data available on GDPPCUS cy, Corruption cy, 
and Antiques_Gapcy, yielding a final unbalanced sample of 1193 country-year observations for HS 
Code 9706 covering 162 countries (the sample will differ slightly when we broaden our sample to 
include all trade data for HS Code 97). We present summary statistics in Table 1 for the full 
sample, and also the sample split based on countries’ median values of Antiques_Gapcy. Strikingly, 
the difference in Corruptioncy between the two groups is 1.14, which is a very large number given 
Corruptioncy’s standard deviation of 1.07. However, this may be somewhat confounded by the 
correlation with income that is also evident in Table 1. There is also a significant difference in 
log(1+MetHoldingsc) and also MetDummyc for the two groups. Finally, we note that there are 
many more observations per country for the high Antiques_Gapcy subgroup – this is unsurprising, 




We present the raw relationship between Corruptionc and Antiques_Gapcy for the year 2000 in 
Figure 1. There is a clear positive relationship (with a correlation coefficient ρ = 0.52) – more 
corrupt countries are more likely to under-report in their customs data some of the exports to the 
United States relative to the U.S. customs import data. It is interesting to note that many countries 
that are well-endowed in ancient objects – Egypt, Syria, Iran, Greece – are well above the 
regression line. The reason for this is intuitive – as noted in Section 2, illegal exports constitute   10
only a component of HS 9706, and it is plausible that this component is higher for such countries. 
In fact, for MetDummyc=0 countries, the average value of Antiques_Gapcy is 2.90; for 
MetDummyc=1 countries, the average value of Antiques_Gapcy is 4.98. This suggests the 
importance of controlling for a country’s stock of desirable objects, which we do now in a 
regression framework. 
Our baseline specification is as follows: 
 
(2)  Antiques_Gapcy = α + β1*Corruptioncy + β2*MetDummycy 
                  + Controlscy + Region-Year Fixed Effects + εcy 
 
While we present results using country-year observations, almost all variation is cross-sectional, so 
we allow for clustering at the country level, and also present results using a cross-section with 
country-level median values. 
  We present our main results in Table 2. In column (1) we include only year effects as 
controls. As suggested by the pattern in Figure 1, the correlation is highly significant and positive 
– the reporting gap in cultural objects is wider for more corrupt countries. In column (2) we 
present the results with log of exporter’s income level, log(GDPPCUScy), and year effects only. 
There is a negative and significant relationship between the reporting gap and exporter’s income 
level, though it is somewhat weaker than that for corruption in column (1). When we include both 
income and corruption measures in column (3), however, we find that the point estimate on 
Corruptioncy actually increases, while income loses its significance entirely. That is, income 
matters only insofar as it is correlated with corruption. Adding Region*Year effects in column (4) 
yields very similar results. The magnitude, in the range of 1.5, implies that the rate of smuggling of 
cultural objects for relatively high corruption countries such as Mexico or Egypt (Corruptioncy of 
about 0.4 in 2005) is more than double that of more moderately corrupt countries such as Italy and 
Greece (Corruptioncy of about -0.4 in 2005). This is in part due to some outlying values of 
Antiques_Gapcy; however, even when we omit the top and bottom five percent of observations on 
Antiques_Gapcy, the significance of the Corruptioncy is largely unchanged and its value is still 
above 1.2. We also experimented with specifications that included a variety controls such as 
geographic distance, English as primary language, and legal origin; none of these substantively 
affected our results and we suppress them to save space.   11
Some of the outlying observations in Figure 1 also suggest the importance of controlling 
for countries’ stocks of desirable cultural property – for countries with many desirable objects that 
are export restricted, we expect a larger rate of under-reporting for HS 9706 goods. In column (5) 
we include MetDummyc and find that it is highly significant and quantitatively large, implying that 
Antiques_Gapcy is more than double for countries with objects in the Met’s collection highlights; 
the inclusion of MetDummyc has very little effect on the coefficient on Corruptioncy. We also 
expect that the marginal impact of corruption to be greater for countries with larger stocks of 
cultural objects: In the absence of such objects, the reporting gap should be largely noise, and 
hence uncorrelated with corruption; we expect a larger effect of corruption as the potential for 
smuggling increases. We report these results in column (6) and find that the interaction term is 
highly significant with a magnitude of about 0.5.
12 In columns (7) and (8) we repeat our analyses 
using log(1+MetHoldingsc) in place of MetDummyc; the implied magnitudes are very similar for 
both measures.  
  We present results for four additional countries that are potential destination markets for 
cultural objects. Three of these – Switzerland, Great Britain, and Germany – are noteworthy in that 
none ratified the 1970 UNESCO Convention until very recently (Germany is still not a signatory to 
the Convention). By contrast, our fourth country – Canada – ratified the UNESCO Convention and 
passed the Cultural Property Export and Import Act in 1978 that provides stringent controls on 
importing cultural objects that were illegally exported. However, by many accounts enforcement 
has been spotty, and only five cases of illegal imports have been resolved since 1992 (Department 
of Canadian Heritage, 2003, 2005). We present results using our preferred specification that 
includes Region*Year dummies in Table 3. In all cases, the coefficient on Corruptioncy is 
significant at the one percent level. In all cases, the coefficient is in the range of 0.5 – 1.
13 This is 
both surprising and interesting given the range of legal statutes across the four markets: 
Switzerland has a reputation as a haven for laundering the provenance of ancient art, whereas 
Canada has potentially strong legal sanction against trafficking in cultural property. 
  Finally, in Table 4 we present a range of robustness tests. In Column (1) we report results 
using exporter-level medians to take away the time-series element of our variation. The coefficient 
                                                 
12 If we include log(GDPPCUScy)*MetDummyc as a control, we find it to be insignificant, and the coefficient on 
Corruptoncy*MetDummyc is unaffected. 
13 Perhaps surprisingly, the coefficient on MetDummyc does not take on any consistent sign across specifications. This 
may reflect different tastes for artifacts across countries, as our measure is U.S.-based.   12
on Corruptioncy is 1.30, marginally lower than the coefficients reported in Table 2. Column (2) 
presents results for imports and exports for HS Code 97 (Works of art. Collectors’ pieces, 
antiques), since some cultural property may be classified in other 4-digit classes, such as paintings 
(9701) or sculpture (9703). We obtain similar, though somewhat weaker, results than those 
reported in Table 2. As previously noted, this may result from the fact that products in HS 97 but 
outside of HS 9706 would be expected to contain a smaller proportion of export-restricted objects. 
In Column (3) we show our results with exporting country fixed effects included. While the 
coefficient on Corruptioncy is still positive, it is no longer significant. This is not surprising, given 
that most of the variation in Corruptioncy is cross-sectional. Finally, we include results using HS 
Code 9503 (Toys, scale models etc, puzzles, parts), by far the largest component of the 2-digit HS 
Code 95; we also report results using the entire HS 95 industry. As a placebo regression this 
industry has the advantages of having had a zero tariff rate since 1994 (and hence no incentive for 
importers to lie to the US customs). We report results for HS 9503 and HS 95 in columns (4) and 
(5) respectively. In both cases, the coefficient on Corruptioncy is indistinguishable from zero. This 
suggests that the positive association between exporter’s corruption and the reporting gap for the 
imports of cultural objects to the U.S. is unlikely due to some missing factors that are common 




Exploring different reporting incentives in the trade in cultural objects and antiques between the 
exporter (e.g., Egypt) and the importer (e.g., the United States) sides, this paper provides a gauge 
for illicit trade in cultural goods. We find strong and robust evidence that the percentage under-
recording of exports of cultural objects is highly correlated the exporting country’s level of 
corruption as measured by a commonly used subjective index. Furthermore, the association 
between the two is stronger for countries that are particularly well-endowed in export-restricted 
objects that are considered to be desirable in the major markets. 
We provide a number of contributions. First, we present a simple methodology that can be 
applied to generate cross-country estimates of illicit trade. This has become feasible only in recent 
years when large and highly-disaggregated trade data from both importing and exporting countries   13
have been made available.
14 While some additional creativity will be required to apply this method 
to other types of illicit trade, we believe that the approach will prove to be useful. For example, 
some legal inputs are required in the production of illegal drugs: potassium permanganate is used 
to produce crack cocaine, but also many other products. As a result, it is a controlled substance in 
some countries, such as Colombia, but much less tightly regulated in others. This type of legal 
asymmetry may similarly lead to different reporting incentives which could be utilized in tracking 
other illicit trade. 
Second, we provide an important contribution to the literature on measuring corruption. 
Since mid-1990s, there has been an explosion in the use of corruption indices in empirical 
research.. Because corruption is illegal in most countries, almost all available measures are 
subjective indices based on surveys of citizens, experts, or firms. By finding a clear association 
between smuggling in cultural objects based on objectively collected trade data and a commonly 
used subjective corruption ranking, this paper provides valuable and independent confirmation that 
the survey-based corruption indices contain useful information.  
While it is tempting to try to use our results to calibrate the total volume of trafficking in 
cultural objects into the United States and worldwide, it is not possible to generate any meaningful 
measure based on our analyses. First, the ‘trade gap’ between reported imports and reported 
exports is generally positive for all goods – we are interested in the correlates of this gap rather 
than the level of the gap itself. Further, if we wish to use our regression results for such 
calculations, the numbers we produce will be highly sensitive to our assumptions of the extent of 
trafficking from very low corruption source countries. Given that our results are expressed in terms 
of elasticities, any change in this assumption will naturally generate a proportionate increase in our 
final measure of the total level of trafficking. We will leave this type of exercise for future work.  
                                                 
14 As a practical implication for law enforcement communities, real-time cross-checking of export and import 
declarations may provide an extra tool to capture smuggling.   14
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Figure 1: Percentage Under-reporting of Exports of Cultural Objects  
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Table 1 - Summary Statistics         
   Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Obs 
          
Antiques_Gap 3.83 2.70 -3.58 10.65  1199 
          
Corruption -0.07 1.07 -2.52 2.13  1193 
log(GDPPCUS) 7.82 1.60 4.45 11.21  1193 
MetDummy 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00  162 
log(1+MetHoldings) 0.59 0.95 0.00 4.04  162 
log(Distance) 9.07 0.44 7.64 9.71  161 
          
Above median Antiques_Gap        
Corruption 0.49 0.57 -1.72 2.13  602 
log(GDPPCUS) 7.11 1.18 4.45 10.09  602 
MetDummy 0.62 0.49 0.00 1.00  69 
log(1+MetHoldings) 0.91 1.05 0.00 4.04  69 
log(Distance) 9.13 0.42 7.92 9.65  68 
          
Below median Antiques_Gap        
Corruption -0.65 1.15 -2.52 1.36  591 
log(GDPPCUS) 8.54 1.66 4.95 11.21  591 
MetDummy 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00  93 
log(1+MetHoldings) 0.35 0.79 0.00 3.78  93 
log(Distance) 9.03 0.46 7.64 9.71  93 
Notes: Antiques_Gap is defined as log(1+US_Imports) - log(1+Exports_to_US), 
where US_Imports are imports reported by the United States for HS Code 9706 from 
country c, and Exports_to_US are exports destined for the United States for HS Code 
9706 from country c. Corruption is (the negative of) the Kaufman et al (2006) measure 
of corruption. GDPPCUS is per capita income for country c in constant 2000 US 
dollars. MetDummy denotes that country c is reported as the country of origin for at 
least one item in the Metropolitan Museum of Art's highlights collection. MetHoldings 
is the number of pre-19th Century items in the Metropolitan Museum's highlights 
collection. Corruption and GDPPCUS are country-year level observations; 
MetDummy and MetHoldings are country-level observations. Please see section 2 of 
the text for further information and sources. 
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Table 2 - Correlation between corruption and smuggling of cultural objects 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Corruption  1.371***    1.602*** 1.468*** 1.404*** 1.165*** 1.385*** 1.117*** 
  (0.111)    (0.222)  (0.235) (0.213) (0.219) (0.211) (0.192) 
log(GDPPCUS)    -0.720***  0.182  0.014 0.005 0.004 -0.024 0.027 
    (0.098)  (0.163)  (0.199) (0.176) (0.175) (0.174) (0.162) 
MetDummy         1.105***  1.153***    
         (0.280)  (0.272)    
MetDummy           0.535***    
           *Corruption            (0.202)     
log(1 + MetHoldings)              0.783***  0.930*** 
            (0.161)  (0.131) 
log(1  +  MetHoldings)             0.519*** 
           *Corruption                    (0.103) 
Fixed Effects  Year  Year  Year  Region*Yr Region*Yr Region*Yr Region*Yr Region*Yr
Observations  1193  1193  1193  1193 1193 1193 1193 1193 
R-squared  0.30  0.18  0.30  0.40 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country.  The dependent variable in all regressions is Antiques_Gap, 
which  is defined as log(1+US_Imports) - log(1+Exports_to_US), where US_Imports are imports reported by the United States 
for HS Code 9706 from country c, and Exports_to_US are exports destined for the United States for HS Code 9706 from 
country c. Corruption is (the negative of) the Kaufman et al (2006) measure of corruption. GDPPCUS is per capita income for 
country c in constant 2000 US dollars. MetDummy denotes that country c is reported as the country of origin for at least one 
item in the Metropolitan Museum of Art's highlights collection. MetHoldings is the number of pre-19th Century items in the 
Metropolitan Museum's highlights collection. Corruption and GDPPCUS are country-year level observations; MetDummy and 
MetHoldings are country-level observations. Please see section 2 of the text for further information and sources. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   19
 
Table 3 - Predicting the Antiques_Gap in other importing countries   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Corruption 0.582**  0.807***  0.761**  0.924*** 
 (0.286)  (0.248)  (0.335)  (0.323) 
log(GDPPCUS) -0.134  0.035 -0.073  0.241 
 (0.231)  (0.205)  (0.241)  (0.256) 
MetDummy -0.222  0.996***  -0.030  0.274 
  (0.328) (0.323)  (0.348)  (0.325) 
Importing Country  Switzerland  Germany Great  Britain  Canada 
Observations 470  483  692 528 
R-squared 0.38  0.35  0.33  0.27 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country.  The dependent 
variable in all regressions is Antiques_Gap, which is defined as 
log(1+Imports_by_k) - log(1+Exports_to_k), where Imports_by_k are imports 
reported by country k (Switzerland, Germany, UK or Canada) for HS Code 9706 
from country c, and Exports_to_k are exports destined for country k for HS Code 
9706 as reported by country c. Corruption is (the negative of) the Kaufman et al 
(2006) measure of corruption. GDPPCUS is per capita income for country c in 
constant 2000 US dollars. MetDummy denotes that country c is reported as the 
country of origin for at least one item in the Metropolitan Museum of Art's 
highlights collection. Corruption and GDPPCUS are country-year level 
observations; MetDummy is a country-level observations. Please see section 2 of the 
text for further information and sources. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 4 - Robustness Tests         
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Corruption 1.298***  0.983***  0.291  -0.090  -0.036 
 (0.198)  (0.205)  (0.311)  (0.197)  (0.203) 
log(GDPPCUS) 0.021 -0.154 0.305 -0.281**  -0.553*** 
 (0.143)  (0.151)  (0.390)  (0.139)  (0.175) 
MetDummy 1.396***  1.098***    0.091 0.099 
  (0.288) (0.244)    (0.209)  (0.308) 
HS Code  9706   97  9706  9503  95 
Fixed Effects  Region  Region*Year  Country & Yr  Region*Year  Region*Year 
Observations 162  1439  1193  972 1221 
R-squared 0.50  0.34  0.75  0.19  0.19 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country.  The dependent variable in all regressions is 
Antiques_Gap, which is defined as log(1+US_Imports) - log(1+Exports_to_US), where US_Imports are 
imports reported by the United States from country c, and Exports_to_US are exports destined for the United 
States from country c. The relevant industry code is listed above in the Table. Specification (1) employs a 
cross-section with country-level medians from 1996-2005 of all variables; in (2) - (5) uses all years 
individually. Corruption is (the negative of) the Kaufman et al (2006) measure of corruption. GDPPCUS is per 
capita income for country c in constant 2000 US dollars. MetDummy denotes that country c is reported as the 
country of origin for at least one item in the Metropolitan Museum of Art's highlights collection. Corruption 
and GDPPCUS are country-year level observations; MetDummy is a country-level observations. HS Code 9706 
is Antiques of an age exceeding one hundred years; HS Code 97 is Works of art, Collectors’ pieces, antiques. 
HS 9503 is Toys, scale models etc, puzzles, parts. HS Code 95 is Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and 
accessories thereof. Please see section 2 of the text for further information and sources. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 